An Uncertainty Argument for the Identified Victim Bias

Journal of Applied Philosophy

ABSTRACT

Do we have a reason to prioritize saving identified lives over statistical lives? Most philosophers say no. Many find it difficult to offer a reason for doing so that does not violate other moral constraints – for example, respect for the moral equality of persons. In this article, I provide an argument in favor of the ‘identified victim bias’. I rely on a contractualist framework to argue that in cases of ex ante uncertainty – that is, cases where individuals are unaware whether they will ultimately end up in either the identified or statistical group and, thus, do not know the exact probabilities assigned to their choices – we should prioritize saving identified lives. Further, I explain that in ‘real world’ cases, this kind of uncertainty is very common. I demonstrate the consequences of this argument by examining an applied case that deals with the question of identified versus statistical lives – choosing between providing expensive retroviral treatment for current AIDS patients or increasing the availability of preventive measures for HIV. I argue that the uncertainty argument gives us a reason to fund AIDS treatment, even though HIV prevention may be more cost effective and save more lives.